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Sixty-eight years ago, Felix Frankfutter and
M. Landis published The Business of the
Court: A Study in the Federal JudiSystem. Its eight chapters originally appeared
in the Harvard Law Reviev.1, the first in
of 1925, and the last in April of1927. When
work afterward emerged as a book, its
dedicated it to Oliver Wendell Holmes,
acknowledging his twenty-five Terms as a
of the Supreme Court of the United

My copy of The Business of the Supreme
has been ill used by time, as have both
validity of its basic assumption and the
of its research. My copy is thickened by a
binding; its curved covers close like a
around pages brown with age and stiff
decay. At some time since its binding, it
been left to the damp; now it is stained, and
smell s of mildew. When this book first
as a history oflegislation it epitomized
latest trend in legal scholarship ; now, the
of its focus best illustrates its
When first published, its underlying
that the Supreme Court's workload
beyond the Court's control went unquesnow, that assumption is regularly quesThe book is dated and myopic. It is,
ess, a classic in the strictest sense. It is
composed and presented. It superbly
a wider-ranging scholarship of which its
were recogni zed pioneers. As the early
of scholar-reformers influential in the
of American legal culture, it ought to

be of enduring interest to students of social as
well as legal history.
Felix Frankfurter's name is surely familiar,
but that of James McCauley Landis, his coauthor, is likely less so. When they wrote the book,
Frankfurter had been for eleven years a member
of the faculty of the Harvard Law School, and
Landis, his former student, had returned after
grad uation to act as Professor Frankfurter's
research assistant and pursue Harvard's brandnew degree, Doctor of Juridical Science. Frankfurter would make his historical mark as the
protege of the Progressive leader Justice Louis
Brandeis, as advisor to both Roosevelt Presidents, and eventually, as an often-dissenting Justice in the Supreme Court of the United States,
most notably during Chief Justice Earl Warren's
stewardship. 1 James McCauley Landis, while
perhaps not as famous as his coauthor, played
key leadership roles in the New Deal, both in
reviving the Federal Trade Commission and in
launching the Securities and Exchange Commission. At the tender age of thirty-six, Landis
became dean of the Harvard Law School. Eventually, he would end a distinguished career of
public service as a close advisor to President
John F. Kennedy. 2
The Business of the Supreme Court was
well received at its publication. Harold Lasswell
wrote in The American Journal of Sociology:

That such a book as this should issue
from the most famous law school in
the United States is nothing less than
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an epochal event. It evidences the
broadening of research interests on
the part of the instructional staff, and
this is presumably hot without effect
upon the actual routine of law training. In view of the peculiar dependence of American polity upon the
lawyer, this is truly a matter of national
concern. 3
From Princeton, John Dickinson wrote that
one of the outstanding values of this book was
the light it shined on the processes and quality
of American legislation.

The thoroughness and detail of this
account disclose, as would a similar
account of the history of any other
important branch of legislation, the
enormous slowness of our legislative
process, and the character of the
obstacles it must overcome.4
Edward S. Corwin, never a generous critic,
found the work " . . . based on wide research,
... well arranged and pleasingly written. It suffers, if anything, from the excess of its virtues." 5
W.P.M. Kennedy, writing for the English Historical Review, was lavish in his praise:

The history of the nation seems to
pass before us, as we follow the details of the "business" of the Supreme
Court in interpreting the Constitution
. . . Nowhere else is it possible to study
in such a fine setting the interaction
of political, economic, and legal forces
in the jurisprudence of a modern
state. 6
In The Business of the Supreme Court,
Frankfurter and Landis confronted a recurring
problem for the Supreme Cowt, a docket overcrowded with requests fo r appellate review.
Attributing this oversupply in the Highest Cowt
to growth in the business of courts below, the
authors traced, from the fi rst j udiciary act in 1789
to the so-called "Judges' Bill" of 1925, a long
line of congressional reactions to perceived needs
or faults in federal jurisdiction. For the most part,
the authors concentrated on three maj or changes
in their chronicle of juri sdictional evolution:

_F rankfurter 's coauthor, James McCauley La ndis, became
dean of Harvard Law School a t age thirty-six after hal'ing helped establish severa l New Deal agencies, including
the Securities and Exchange Commission.

elimination of circuit riding by Supreme Court
Justices, establishment of intermediate federal
courts of appeal, and gradual replacement of
statutory rights of appeal in the Supreme Court
with fo rms of appellate rev iew affording the
Court the power to refuse a hearing. In passing,
Frankfu rter and Landis m ade note of lesser
jurisdictional modifications, such as changes to
the way decisions of the Comt of Claims and
tetTitOiial courts are reviewed, and the brief life
of the Commerce Court. Some of these topics,
like circuit riding, may seem of interest today
only to historians of the Comt, but others touch
on matters of modern as well as historical relevance. For example, the account by FrankfUJter
and Landis of bills in both houses of the fortyfourth Congress to withhold federal j urisdiction
in cases arising from the actions of corporations
ou tside the state of their incorporation7 certainly
seems relevant to recent discussions of the continued importance of diversity j urisdiction. The
book's contrast of the relative success of a court
entertaining nothing but appeals from administration of the tariff laws with the short life of the
court established to review nothing but orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission provides
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BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
a useful background to contemporary debate concerning new courts for other subjects now deemed
more or less specialized. Only in 1988 would
occur the apparently final step in congressional
substitution for appeals to the Supreme Court as
a matter of right of appellate forms affording the
Court the power to refuse review. 8
Even th e long and detailed account (with
wh ich Professor Corwin expressed impatience)
of the process by which circuit riding by the
Justices was ultimately abandoned offers some
intriguing food for contemporary thought. Most
students of the Court's history are probably
familiar with the practical difficulties confronting early Justices attempting to fulfill their circuit riding duties, especially those assigned to
th e frontier circuits. Most are also likely to
recall that an appreciation of these difficulties
led the last Congress controlled by Federalists
to dispense with such requirements after little
more than a decade. It is conventional wisdom
oauthor,James McCauley Landis, became
that partisan retaliation by congressional mem·d Law School at age thirty-six after bavbers of Jefferson's Republican Party prompted
•blish several New Deal agencies, including
legislation the following year, frustrating that
nd Exchange Commission.
salutary reform. Not so widely known, perhaps,
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phase of growth in judicial review demand to
"vast extensions of federal jurisdiction" following the Civil War. They pointed to not only the
familiar example of the Judiciary Act of 1875,
for the first tin1e opening federal as well as state
courts to most cases involving federal law, but
also to a host of enactments permitting defendants to shift cases from state to federal court in
more or less specific circumstances. The authors'
sage observation regarding this "revolution"
bears repeating:

The history of the federa l courts is
woven into the history of the times.
The factors in our national life which
came in with reconstruction are the
same factors which increased the
business of t he federa l courts,
enlarged their jurisdiction, modified
and expanded their structure. The
problems, to be sure, are the recurring problems which began with the
First Judiciary Act and are active today; they are the enduring problems
of the relation of states to nation. But
their incidence and intensity have varied, as they are bound to vary at different epochs. For law and courts are
instruments of adjustment, and the
compromises by which the general
problems of federalism are successively met determine the contemporaneous structure of the federal courts
and the range of their authority. 11
Ironically, in light of its title, The Business
of the Supreme Court is much less concerned
with judicial than with legislative history. The
book is vittually devoid of the stuff of what then
constituted conventional Supreme Court scholarship, doctrine and biography. Inside its
covers, the influence of events, theory, and personality on the decisional work of the Cowt is
simply left unaddressed. Perhaps the authors
considered Charles Warren's recent work to have
occupied any wider field of institutional scholarship.1 2 Moreover, as legislative history, The
Business of the Supreme Court is limited, in
the main, to materials found in formal and open
sources, such as congressional records, official
collections, and legal periodicals. The authors
made few references to the larger political and
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social forces influencing Congress's inclination
to tinker with federal jurisdiction. Missing, for
example, is how the federal courts' admiralty
jurisdiction was extended in the early nineteenth
century to inland waters as the nation embraced
the Mississippi's watershed and the Great Lakes.
The architect of this enlargement of federal
judicial power was unquestionably Justice Story,
both from the Bench of the Supreme Court and
behind the scenes in Congress. Because Justice
Story penned an anomalous opinion for the Court
in The Thomas Jejjerson 13 to the contrary, it is
surely of interest that the steamboat in that case
was owned by brothers of Senator Johnson of
Tennessee, sponsor of an ultimately unsuccessful bill to limit federal maritime jurisdiction to
cases involving tidal waters. 14
The preoccupation of the authors with legislation as the remedy for an overworked Supreme
Court must have made the book especially curious to contemporary readers conversant with
trends in legal scholarship. Frankfurter and
Landis presented the history of Supreme Court

appellate jurisdiction as one ofmore or less timely
congressional development in response to
observed superabundance of requests for
Supreme Court review. The authors said practically nothing about the Court's own efforts to
manage more efficiently its crowded dockets and
minimize delay in its judgments. In the forma.
ti ve period of which Frankfurter and Landis
wrote, when most review by the Court belonged
to the litigant losing in a lower court by right,
the workload of the Supreme Court was surely
affected by several of i ts own decisions.
Examples include: the decision in Barron v. Ba/.
timore 15 that the Bill of Rights did not bind states·
the decision in Ex parte McCardle 16 that Con:
gress could strip the Court of jurisdiction to
issue a writ of habeas corpus (even in a case in
wh ich oral argument had already been heard);
the decision in The Civil Rights Cases 17 that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not reach acts of
private racism; and the Court's uncontestable
presumption announced three years later in Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. 18

Felix Frankfurter answered questions at his confirmation hearings in 1939 with the coaching of Dean Acheson, his
advisor (sitting to his right). Perhaps no other nominee has been so familiar with the Cout·t a nd its workings: Frank·
furter had written extensively about the institution during his iUush·ious teaching career at Harvard Law School. Acheson.
an attorney in private practice, had been a clerk to Justice Louis D. Brandeis.
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that corporations were persons enjoying rights
under the Fowteenth Amendment. These decisions regarding the reach ofthe Constitution set
the outer limits of jurisdiction, and thus influenced the dockets of all courts charged with its
enforcement. Among the courts so affected was
the Supreme Court itself, which had, in Martin
"·Hunter's Lessee, 19 1aid claim to the power to
dispose of appeals that the highest court of a state
had erred in its interpretation of the national
charter. Frankfurter and Landis made brief mention only of congressional reaction to McCardle 20
and referred to Martin v. Hunter 's Lessee only
for Justice Story's dictum regarding the obligation of Congress to confer on the lower federal
comts all jurisdiction permitted by Article III.2 1
No mention of Barron v. Baltimore, The Civil
Rights Cases, or Santa Clara County appears in
The Business of the Supreme Court at all.
If j udgments of the Court respecting jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution are
conspicuous by their general absence from The
Business of the Supreme Co urt, other steps by
the Court both tending to and intended to move
cases more rapidly to decision were noted by
Frankfmter and Landis, albeit in passing. One
such step was the imposition of limits on oral
argument. In a footnote, they r ecounted how,
in 1812, the Court announced a rule of practice
for the first time limiting to two the number of
counsel permitted to argue for each side in a
cause. In three sentences, they present the
Court's establishment in 1849 of limits on how
long each counsel could hold forth. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist tells the same story elsewhere,

Originally there was no limit set on the
time a lawyer might devote to arguing his case in the Court. Indeed, the
Court had so little to do in its first few
years that it would have had no good
reason to place time limits on counsels' arguments . . . But as the Supreme Court's docket grew more
crowded , this sort of expenditure of
time in a very important case [five full
Court days in Gibbons v. Ogden]
proved to be a luxury. In the middle
of the nineteenth century the Court
placed a limit of two hours on the time
to be taken by counsel for each side. 22
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No mention was made in The Business of
the Supreme Court of another 1849 innovation
by the Court, a rule that, when a case has been
called for argument in two successive Terms, and
neither party is prepared to argue it, the case shall
be dismissed. 23 Finally, there was no mention of
the Coutt's development of the practice of dismissing summarily appeals of right for want of
a substantial federal question, or when the decision of a state court is sustainable on state law
grounds, although the fmmer has been traced to
a decision in 1868,24 and the latter to a decision
seven years later.25
Frankfurter and Landis offered a picture of
appellate jurisdiction evolving in response to
strains on the Court's capacity for judicial
review. If that picture is less than comprehensive because it concentrates on legis lative
changes to the exclusion of the Court's doctrinal
and procedural home remedies, it is nevertheless trend-setting scholarship, all the more noteworthy because its Harvard-trai ned authors
eschewed study of Supreme Court case law in
favor of study of federal legislation. Frankfurter
and Landis wrote from Harvard less than fifty
years after Christopher Columbus Langdell had
revolutionized the study oflaw by promoting the
critical interpretation of judicial opinions and
persuading legal scholars that a science of law
could be induced from the utterances of judges
administering the common law. This revolution
began at the Harvard Law School, where
Langdell became dean in 1870, but soon spread
nationwide, as Langdell's disciples migrated to
other schools. 26 Preoccupied with the common
law, Langdell 's new science discounted the contribution of legislation, and its examination was
consequently discouraged.
While law professors in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries were confining their
students to analyzing judicial opinions, frustration in the greater world beyond law school with
the lawmaking of judges was prompting more
frequent resort to legislation for dealing with
emergent social and economic challenges. At
the same time the initiative shifted from courthouse to legislature, the rate of lawmaking
accelerated, in response to the rapidity of change
in an industrial age. There dawned what Dean
Calabresi has aptly named the Age ofStatutes.27
Legal education and scholarship could lag only
so far behind, and to Langdell's fixation with
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the common law, there inevitably arose a reaction. The early leaders of this reaction, James
Bradley Thayer, Holmes, and Roscoe Pound, all
influenced Frankfurter, inculcating a skepticism
about doctrine and a recognition of law's wider
antecedents. Indeed, Dean Pound, the broker of
the modern marriage of law and socio logy,
brought Frankfurter to the Harvard faculty, as
Frankfurter subsequently brought Landis. In the
year following publication of The Business of
the Supreme Court, Harvard named Landis its
first research professor of legislation. Taking note
of this appointment, The Nation found it illustrative of "The New Legal Education." In its
own way this reaction to Langdellian method and
jurisprudence was a revolution, and The Busi-

ness of the Supreme Court one of the clearest
trumpet calls.
When The Business of the Supreme Court
was publish ed, its greatest strength was its
attention to legislation as a primary source of
law. Audaciously, the authors demonstrated
legislation's importance to juri sdiction, the very
law that regulates judicial power. That approach
presented a bold challenge to the presumption
that case analysis alone constituted legal scholarship. Ironically, that approach has, over time,
mutated into the book's greatest weakness, as
scholars have continued to recognize and explore
additional facets of lawmaking. That the book is
now obsolete ought not justify that it is now
neglected, but it explains it.
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